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Abstract—Revenue maximization (RM) is one of the most important problems on online social networks (OSNs), which attempts to
find a small subset of users in OSNs that makes the expected revenue maximized. It has been researched intensively before. However,
most of exsiting literatures were based on non-adaptive seeding strategy and on simple information diffusion model, such as
IC/LT-model. It considered the single influenced user as a measurement unit to quantify the revenue. Until Collaborate Game model [1]
appeared, it considered activity as a basic object to compute the revenue. An activity initiated by a user can only influence those users
whose distance are within k-hop from the initiator. Based on that, we adopt adaptive seed strategy and formulate the Revenue
Maximization under the Size Budget (RMSB) problem. If taking into account the product’s promotion, we extend RMSB to the Revenue
Maximization under the Community Budget (RMCB) problem, where the influence can be distributed over the whole network. The
objective function of RMSB and RMCB is adatpive monotone and not adaptive submodular, but in some special cases, it is adaptive
submodular. We study the RMSB and RMCB problem under both the speical submodular cases and general non-submodular cases,
and propose RMSBSolver and RMCBSolver to solve them with strong theoretical guarantees, respectively. Especially, we give a
data-dependent approximation ratio for RMSB problem under the general non-submodular cases. Finally, we evaluate our proposed
algorithms by conducting experiments on real datasets, and show the effectiveness and accuracy of our solutions.
Index Terms—Collaborate Game model, Online Social Networks (OSNs), Revenue maximization, Adaptive strategy, Non-submodular,
Approximation Algorithm
F
1 INTRODUCTION
THE prosperous development of online social networks(OSNs) has derived a number of famous social plat-
forms, such as Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter and WeChat,
which have become the main means of communication.
There are more than 1.52 billion users active daily on Face-
book and 321 million users active monthly on Twitter. These
social platforms have been taken as an effective advertising
channel by many companies to promote their products
through ”word-of-mouth” effect. It motivates the researches
about viral marketing. The OSNs can be represented as
an undirected graph, where nodes are users and edges
denote the friendships between two users. Viral marketing,
proposed by Domingos and Richardson [2] [3], aims to max-
imize the follow-up users by giving rewards, coupons, or
discounts to a subset of users who are the most influential.
Then, Kempe et al. [4] formulated Influence Maximization
(IM) problem as a combinatorial problem: selects a subset of
users as the seed set under the cardinality budget, such that
the expected number of users who are influenced by this
seed set can be maximized. They proposed two information
diffusion models that were accepted by most researchers
in subsequent researches: Independent Cascade model (IC-
model) and Linear Threshold model (LT-model), and proved
IM is NP-hard and its objective function is monotone sub-
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modular under these two models, thus, a good approxima-
tion can be obtained by natural greedy algorithm [5]. After
this milestone work, a series of variant problems based on
IM model and adapted to different application scenarios
were emerged. For example, Revenue Maximization (RM),
also called Profit Maximization, is a representative among
them. RM problem is commonly studied in the literature [6]
[7] [8] [9] [10] [11]. More different factors, such as product
price, discount, cost [12] [13] [14] [15] and their impact on
propagation, need to be considered in maximizing revenue.
From the perspective of companies, their objecitves are
to maximize the exptected total revenue by selecting a
subset of users from the whole network. However, most
existing researches about RM problem were based on non-
adaptive seeding strategy, where we select all seed nodes
in one batch but do not consider the influence diffusion
process. Thus, non-adaptive seeding is not the best choice
to solve RM problem. Compared to that, adaptive one can
response with a better seeding strategy because of making
decision according to the real-time feedback from the users.
Not only can it take advantage of the limited budget more
wisely, but also adapt to the dynamic features of a social
network. For example, the network topology is changing at
any time because users join or leave, and friendships con-
struct or terminate. In addition, most previous researches
were based on the simple information diffusion model,
such as IC-model or LT-model, where they considered the
number of follow-up users that accept our information
cascade. It applies user as a measurement unit to quantify
the revenue, where each user corresponds to a fixed value
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of revenue. Sometimes, this is not enough and we need
to apply activity as a measurement unit to quantify the
revenue. Suppose some user in facebook is invited by a
company to initiate an activity, after accepting and initiating
this activity, the nerghbor users of this initiator would be
infected. The initiator’s friends, or friends of friends, may
be participate in this activity. Thus, Guo et al. [1] propose
Collaborate Game model to characterize this scene, where
the total revenue gained by the company is correlated to
the number of successfully initiated activity. The number
of participants is different among different activities. For a
single activity, the revenue we can obtain from this activity
is related to the number of its participants, but not simple
linear relationship. In general, the closer the distance is from
the initiator, the more business benefit this participant will
provide.
Based on the Collaborate Game model, we propose the
Revenue Maximization under the Size Budget (RMSB) prob-
lem. RMSB aims to maximize the total revenue by inviting a
small number of users to initiate an activity in an adaptive
strategy. We adopt adaptive seeding strategy because: before
sending an invitation to a potential initiator, we do not know
whether she will accept it and how many users around
her will follow and join together. By adaptive strategy,
we can observe the actual state of users and edges after
sending an invitation. Besides, for a company, they should
not only consider the largest revenue, but also consider
the promotion effect of this product. According to that, we
propose the Revenue Maximization under the Community
Budget (RMCB) problem, where the number of invited users
in each community of the targeted network is constrained.
In this way, we can make sure there exists several activities
happened in every area of the entire network, thus, the
balance of influence distribution is guaranteed. Relied on
the adaptive greedy policy, we design RMSBSolver and
RMCBSolver algorithms to solve RMSB and RMCB respec-
tively. The objective function of RMSB and RMCB problem
is adaptive monotone and not adaptive submodular, but
in some special cases, it is adaptive submodular. In this
paper, the community budget of RMCB can be represented
by use of partition matroid, and we can obtain a constant
approximation ratio for RMCB problem under the special
submodular cases. For the RMSB problem, it is an open
question left by [1] how to get a theoretical bound for
general non-submodular cases. In this paper, we attempt to
solve it. Smith et al. [16] proposed the concept of adaptive
primal curvature and adaptive total primal curvature. We
give a bound for adaptive total primal curvature and then,
with the help of that, we can obtain a data-dependent
approximation ratio for RMSB problem. Our contributions
are summarized as follows:
1) Based on Collaborate Game model, we propose
RMSB and RMCB problem, which are adaptive
monotone but not adaptive submodular.
2) We design RMSBSolver and RMCBSolver algo-
rithms to RMSB and RMCB problem, generalize
RMCB to partition matroid, and obtain a (1/2)-
approximation under the special submodular cases.
3) To RMSB problem, we prove the solution re-
turned by RMCBSolver satisfies a data-dependent
(1 − e− 1δ )-approximation under the general non-
submodular cases.
4) Our proposed algorithms are evaluted on real-
world datasets, and it shows that our algorithms are
effective and better than other baseline algorithms.
Organiztion: In Section 2, we survey the related work
in RM and adaptive submodular optimization. We then
present RMSB and RMCB problem in Section 3, discuss
the algorthms in Section 4 and introduce the comprehen-
sive theoretical analysis in Section 5. Finally, we conduct
experiments and conclude in Section 6 and Section 7.
2 RELATED WORK
Domingos and Richardson [2] [3] were the first to study viral
marketing and the value of customers in social networks.
Kempe et al. [4] studied IM as a discrete optimization prob-
lem and generalized IC-model and LT-model to triggering
model, who provided us with a greedy algorithm and a
constant approximation ratio. RM is an important variant
problem of IM, and its existing researches focused on in
the non-adaptive setting. [7] [8] studied the problem that
selects quality seed users such that maximizing revenue
with the help of influence diffusion. Lu et al. [7] extended
the LT-model to include prices and valuation, who used a
heuristic unbedgeted greedy framework to solve this prob-
lem. Tang et al. [8] applied deterministic and randomized
double greedy algorithms [17] to solve the RM problem.
If the objective function is non-negative and submodular,
they obtained a (1/3)- and (1/2)-approximation ratio re-
spectively. Zhang et al. [9] investigated RM problem with
multiple adoptions, which aimed at maximizing the overall
profit across all products. Liu et al. [18] considered RM
with coupons in his new model, independent cascade model
with coupons and valuations (IC-CV), and solved it based
on local search algorithm [19]. Recently, Tong et al. [20]
designed randomized algorithms, called simulation-based
and realization-based RM, to address the RM with coupons
and achieved a (1/2)-approximation with high probability.
Guo et al. [21] proposed a composed influence model with
complementary products and gave a solution by use of
sandwich approximation framework [22].
In the adaptive setting, Golovin et al. [23] were the first
to study the adaptive submodular optimization problem.
Similar to the monotonicity and submodularity of set func-
tion, they extended these two concepts to adaptive version,
adaptive monotonicity and adaptive submodularity, and
proved that the solution returned by adaptive greedy policy
is a (1 − 1/e)-approximation if the objective function is
adaptive monotone and adaptive submodular. Applied it
to social networks, Tong et al. [24] provided a systematic
study on the adaptive influence maximization problem
with different (partial or full) feedback model, especially
for the algorithmic analysis of the scenarios when it is
not adaptive submodular. Smith et al. [16] introduced two
important concepts, adaptive primal curvature and adaptive
total primal curvature, to obtain a valid approximation ratio
for adaptive greedy policy when the objective function is
adaptive monotone but not adaptive submodular. Further,
when the objective function is not adaptive monotone, but
adaptive submodular, Gotoves et al. [25] extended random
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greedy algorithm to adaptive policy and obtained a (1/e)-
approximation. Other researches on the application of adap-
tive strategy can refer to [26] [27] [28] [29].
3 PROBLEM AND PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we talk about some preliminary knowledges
and concepts to the rest of paper, which maily includes
model review and problem definition.
3.1 Model Recapitulation
The problem in this paper is an extension based on Collab-
orate Game model [1], thus, we need to review it briefly
here. If you want to know more details about Collaborate
Game model, please read [1]. The Collaborate Game model
is defined in the targeted network, which is an undirected
graph G = (V,E) where V = {v1, v2, ..., vn} is the set of n
users and E = {e1, e2, ..., em} is the set of m edges. If the
edge e = {u, v} exists, it means user u and v are friend, and
there is a probability pe ∈ [0, 1] representing their intimacy.
For each user v, we denote N(v) as the set of users who are
the neighbor (friend) of v.
Definition 1 (Collaborate Game [1]). When a game company
invites a user u ∈ V to play their game, she accepts this invitation
to launch this game with probability θu. If she accepts it, we call
her as ”initiator”, and in round 1, the initiator u will invite each
of her friend v ∈ N(u) to participate in this game with success
probability puv . We call user u as 0-hop participant and user v ∈
N(u) who accepts the invitation from u as 1-hop participant. In
round i, each (i-1)-hop participant u′ will invite each of her friend
v′ ∈ N(u′) to participate in this game with success probability
pu′v′ . Then, the process terminates until finishing round k.
Then, we have a ”Tendency Assumption”: assuming that
a user u is an i-hop participant to one initiator x and a j-hop
participant to another initiator y, where i ≤ j, at this time,
we consider user u will choose to be an i-hop participant to
initiator x. There are two additional parameters associated
to our model:
1) Acceptance vector θ = (θ1, θ2, ..., θn), where each
element θu ∈ [0, 1] is an acceptance probability for
user u ∈ V . It quantifies the likelihood for user
u to accept to be an initiator when she receives
the invitation from the company. In this paper, we
assume θu is uniformly distributed in interval [0, 1].
2) Revenue vector R = (R0, R1, R2, ..., Rk), where
each element Ri ∈ Z+ is the revenue the company
can gain from an i-hop participant. In this paper, we
assume R0 ≥ R1 ≥ R2 ≥ ... ≥ Rk according to the
”Benefit Diminishing” assumption [1].
Remark 1. The Collaborate Game model is based on such a sce-
nario: A game company wants to promote their new multiplayer
game over the targeted network by inviting some users to play
this game. Once they accept it, they will attract their friends
recursively to participate in this game. Then, game company
can obtain revenue from it. Since we assume that the initiator’s
influence range is at most k-hop from her, this model is called k-hop
Collaborate Game model as well. Thus, the ”Benefit Diminishing”
assumption means those participants whose are far from the
initiator will provide less benefit to the company.
Fig. 1. An example that shows the adaptive process: Here, we assume
k = 2, where the state of yellow nodes are 1, other nodes are ?; Green
and purple nodes are 1-hop and 2-hop participants; The state of red,
blue and dotted line are 1, 0 and ?. First, we invite node c, the states
shown as left part; Then, we invite node h, the states shown as right
part. We can see that node e is changed from 2-hop to 1-hop participant
because of node h. [1]
From the perspective of companies, they are not sure
whether she will accept it before sending an invitation to
a potential initiator, and do not know how many users
around her will follow and join together. Therefore, they
need to adopt an adaptive strategy. Before determining who
should be the next potential initiator, they need to make
an observation to the change of states of both users and
networks from the last invitation. Given targeted network
G = (V,E), for each user u ∈ V , the state of u can be
denoted by Xu ∈ {0, 1} ∪ {?}, where Xu = 1 means
user u accepts to be an initiator because of the company’s
invitation and Xu = 0 means user u rejects to be an initiator.
Xu =? means user u is unknown, who did not receive an
invitation from the company. The states of all users are ?
at the beginning. Similarly, for each edge e = {u, v} ∈ E,
the state of e can be denoted by Ye = {0, 1} ∪ {?}, where
Ye = 0 indicates user u (resp. v) did not accept the invitation
from user v (resp. u) and Ye = 1 indicates user u (resp.
v) is willing to play the game with user v (resp. u). Once
determined, it cannot be changed. Ye =? indicates there is
no invitation that happens between user u and user v. The
states of all edges are ? at the beginning.
After defining the states of user and edge, we have a
function φ : {Xu}u∈V ∪{Ye}e∈E → U be all possible states,
which is called as realization. Thus, we say that φ(u) is the
state of user u ∈ V and φ(e) is the state of edge e ∈ E under
the realization φ. We denote by Φ a random realization
and by Pr(φ) = Pr[Φ = φ] the probability distribution
over all realizations. Besides, each realization should be
consistent. Here, each user can only be one of states in
∈ {0, 1} ∪ {?}, and each edge can only be one of states
in {0, 1} ∪ {?} identically. After each pick, our observations
so far can be represented as a partial realization ψ, which
is a function from observed objects to their states. Then,
dom(ψ) is the domain of ψ, that is, the observed objects in
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ψ. A partial realization ψ is consistent with a realization φ
if they are equal everywhere in the domain of ψ, denoted
by φ ∼ ψ. If ψ and ψ′ are both consistent with some φ,
and dom(ψ) ⊆ dom(ψ′), we say ψ is a subrealization of ψ′,
denoted by ψ ⊆ ψ′. Besides, we denote the observed users
in the domain of ψ by dx(ψ), and the observed edges in the
domain of ψ by dy(ψ). [1]
3.2 Problem Definition
At each pick, the game company attempts to send an in-
vitation to a user u according to current partial realization
ψ, and observe the u’s state Φ(u). If Φ(u) = 1, we need to
update ψ, in other words, update the states of edges whose
distance are less than k-hop from user u. In this process, user
u attracts her nearby users to play together. If Φ(u) = 0, we
do nothing and go to the next pick. An example is shown as
Fig. 1. Let pi be such an adaptive policy, and H(pi, φ) be the
set of users who are invited by the game company according
to policy pi under the realization φ. The total revenue gained
according to policy pi under the realization φ can be defined
as follows: [1]
f(H(pi, φ), φ) =
∑
i∈[k]
∑
u∈Di(pi,φ)
Ri (1)
where [k] = {0, 1, 2, ..., k} and Di(pi, φ) is the set that
contains all i-hop participants to the company according to
policy pi under the realization φ, thus, we have
D0(pi, φ) = {u|u ∈ H(pi, φ), φ(u) = 1} (2)
Di(pi, φ) =
{u|∃v ∈ Di−1(pi, φ), φ({u, v}) = 1} \
i−1⋃
j=0
Dj(pi, φ) (3)
Finally, we can evaluate the performance of a policy pi by its
expected revenue, and we have
favg(pi) = EΦ[f(H(pi,Φ),Φ)] (4)
where the expectation is taken with respect to Pr(Φ = φ).
Then, under the k-hop Collaborate Game model, the Rev-
enue Maximization under the Size Budget (RMSB) [1] is
formulated as follows:
Problem 1. Given a targeted networkG = (V,E), an acceptance
vector θ, a size budget b and a revenue vector R, we aim to find
a policy pi∗ such that maximizing the expected revenue under the
k-hop Collaborate Game model, pi∗ ∈ arg maxpi favg(pi), subject
to |H(pi, φ)| ≤ b for all realization φ.
However, a size budget is not enough because not only
we want to maximize the revenue, but also need to consider
the influence distribution. Generally, there exists a commu-
nity structure given a social network, which is a partition
of this network. Given a targeted network G = (V,E),
we assume it exists a unique community structure as C(G)
associated with G, where C(G) = {C1, C2, ..., Cr} is a
partition of V . In other words, it means that V =
⋃r
i=1 Ci
and Ci ∩ Cj = ∅ for any i, j ∈ {1, 2, ..., r}. Denote com-
munity budget by vector b, b = (b1, b2, ..., br). It means
that the number of users that invited to be initiators by the
company in each community Ci ∈ C(G) cannot be larger
than budget bi. Then, under the k-hop Collaborate Game
model, the Revenue Maximization under the Community
Budget (RMCB) is formulated as follows:
Problem 2. Given a targeted network G = (V,E), a community
structure C(G) associated with G, an acceptance vector θ, a
community budget b and a revenue vector R, we aim to find
a policy pi∗ such that maximizing the expected revenue under the
k-hop Collaborate Game model, pi∗ ∈ arg maxpi favg(pi), subject
to |H(pi, φ) ∩ Ci| ≤ bi for any Ci ∈ C(G) and all realization φ.
Community budget in RMCB problem can be general-
ized to the matroid constraint, and we introduce some besic
concepts about matroid here. A matroid M is an order
pair M = (V, I), where V is the ground set, node set in
this paper, and I ⊆ 2V is the collection of independent
sets, which satisfies: (1) For all A ⊂ B ⊆ V , if B ∈ I
then A ∈ I ; (2) For all A,B ∈ I with |B| > |A|, we
have ∃v ∈ B\A such that A ∪ {v} ∈ I . Given a matroid
M, the matroid constraint means that a feasible solution
H(pi, φ) ∈ I(M). The bases of matroid, denoted by B, are
those satisfy B ∈ I and @v ∈ V such that B ∪ {v} ∈ I .
All bases of a matroid have the same size. There is a kind
of special matroid, Partition Matroid, that is related to our
problem: The ground set V is partitioned into disjoint sets
C1, C2, ..., Cr , community structure in this paper, where
V =
⋃r
i=1 Ci. Let bi, community budget in this paper, be
an integer with 0 ≤ bi ≤ |Ci| for any i ∈ {1, 2, ..., r}. I
is an indepndent set, I ∈ I , if and only if |I ∩ Ci| ≤ bi
for any i ∈ {1, 2, ..., r}. The matroid whose independet
sets are defined in this form is called partition matroid.
Therefore, we want to find pi∗ ∈ arg maxpi favg(pi) such that
H(pi, φ) ∈ I for all realization φ, and
I = {S ⊆ V : |S ∩ Ci| ≤ bi for i = 1, 2, ..., r} (5)
where I is a collection of independent sets defined by
partition matroid we talk about before.
4 ALGORITHM
In this section, we propose our algorithms to solve RMSB
and RMCB problem. Adaptive greedy policy, proposed by
Golovin et al. [23], is an effective method to solve such
problems. It can be divided into two steps at each iteration:
1) Send an invitation to the user who has the largest
expected increment of revenue based on the partial
realization ψ.
2) Observe the state of this user, if she accepts this
invitation, update the states of edges whose distance
within k-hop from her; Otherwise, back to (1) to
invite the next user.
The Conditional Exepected Marginal Benefit under the
adaptive surrounding can be shown as follows:
Definition 2 (Conditional Expected Marginal Benefit). Given
a partial realization ψ and an user u, the conditional expected
marginal benefit of u conditioned on observed ψ is
∆(u|ψ) = E [f(dx(ψ) ∪ {u},Φ)− f(dx(ψ),Φ)|Φ ∼ ψ] (6)
In our RMSB and RMCB problem, ∆(u|ψ) is the expected
revenue increment of user u by sending an invitation to
initiate user u. It conditions on the previous observation to
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Algorithm 1 RMSBSolver (G, f,θ,R, b, k)
1: Initialize: H ← ∅, ψ ← ∅
2: for i = 1 to b do
3: for user u ∈ V \H do
4: ∆(u|ψ) ← Computed by Monte-Carlo simulation
or simplified method of Section 4.2 in [1]
5: end for
6: Select ui ∈ arg maxu∈V \H ∆(u|ψ)
7: H ← H ∪ {ui}
8: if ui accepts the invitation then
9: Update ψ, the states of the edges whose distance
are less than k-hop from ui
10: end if
11: end for
12: return H,ψ
users and edges, partial realization ψ, and the expectation is
taken over all realization that are consistant with ψ.
Based on adaptive greedy policy [23], RMSBSolver and
RMCBSolver is proposed, shown as Algorithm 1 and Algo-
rihtm 2. In algorithm 1, we invite a user with the largest
expected revenue increment at each iteration until the num-
ber of invitation is larger than size budget b. However, in
Algorithm 2, it is more complicated. At each iteration, we
need to check whether the candidate set I is empty. This
candidate set is determined by the collection of independent
set I , shown as Equation (5), given community budget b. If
this candidate set is empty, it means that the number of
invitations at each community reaches its budget constraint,
thus, stop inviting at that time.
At each iteration, we need to compute the value of
∆(u|ψ) given current partial realization, which can be done
by Monte-Carlo simulation: running this diffusion process
many times and then take the average of them. In order
to achieve satisfactory accuracy, the number of simulations
cannot be too small, however, it increases the running time
greatly. To improve its scabability, a simplified computing
method was proposed in Algorithm 2, Section 4.2 of [1].
Its core idea is computing the value of ∆(u|ψ) by use of a
technique similar to breath-first searching instead of Monto
carlo simulation. It fixes all potential i-hop participants for
i ∈ [k] in advance, ignores some cases where the proba-
bility of occurrence is low and computes the probability of
potential participants to join this game from up to down.
The time complexity to compute each ∆(u|ψ) is reduced
to O(mn). The effectiveness of this method was validated
by experiments on real-world dataset, and it reduces the
running time significantly under the premise of ensuring
accuracy. Besides, similar to [1], we do not need to compute
∆(u|ψ) for each user u ∈ I repeatedly at each iteration.
If, at iteration i, the selected user ui−1 at the last iteration
rejects the invitation, we do not need to update any ∆(u|ψ).
Otherwise, we only need to update ∆(u|ψ) for those users
whose distences from ui−1 is less than or equal to 2k at
iteration i. It improves the efficieny of Algorithm 1 and
Algorithm 2 further.
Algorithm 2 RMCBSolver (G, C(G), f,θ,R, b, k)
1: Initialize: H ← ∅, ψ ← ∅
2: while True do
3: I ← {v ∈ V \H : H ∪ {v} ∈ I}
4: if I = ∅ then
5: break
6: end if
7: for user u ∈ I do
8: ∆(u|ψ) ← Computed by Monte Carlo simulation
or simplified method of Section 4.2 in [1]
9: end for
10: Select ui ∈ arg maxu∈I ∆(u|ψ)
11: H ← H ∪ {ui}
12: if ui accepts the invitation then
13: Update ψ, the states of the edges whose distance
are less than k-hop from ui
14: end if
15: end while
16: return H,ψ
5 THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we discuss some related conclusions about
RMSB and RMCB problem, and then extend them to gener-
alized non-submodular cases.
5.1 Related Conclusions
Before starting our discussion, we introduce two important
concepts, defined in [23], as follows:
Definition 3 (Adaptive Monotone). A function f is adaptive
monotone with respect to distribution Pr(φ) if the conditional
expected marginal benefit of any user u is nonnegative, i.e., for all
ψ with Pr[Φ ∼ ψ] > 0 and all u ∈ V (G)\dx(ψ), we have
∆(u|ψ) ≥ 0 (7)
Definition 4 (Adaptive Submodular). A function f is adaptive
submodular with respect to distribution Pr(φ) if the conditional
expected marginal benefit of any user u does not increase as
more states of users and edges are observed, i.e., for all ψ and
ψ′ such that ψ is a subrealization of ψ′ (ψ ⊆ ψ′) and all
u ∈ V (G)\dx(ψ′), we have
∆(u|ψ) ≥ ∆(u|ψ′) (8)
Our RMSB and RMCB problem are two instances of
adaptive optimization problem, thus, determined theoreti-
cal bounds can be obtained for both instances by adaptive
greedy policy if our objective function, Equation (4), is
adapative monotone and adaptive submodular. Based on
[1], we have seveal conclusions as follows:
Theorem 1. The RMSB and RMCB problem is NP-hard, and
there are no solutions with polynomial time unless NP=P.
Proof. The RMSB is NP-hard [1], because it can be reduced to
Maximum Coverage problem when setting revenue vector
R = 1, acceptance vector θ = 1 and pe = 1 for each
e ∈ E. Then, when there is only one community in tar-
geted network G, and community budget is a scalar, at this
moment, RMCB can be reduced to RMSB problem. Thus,
RMCB problem is NP-hard as well.
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Lemma 1. The objective function f of the RMSB and RMCB
problem is adaptive monotone.
Lemma 2. The objective function f of the RMSB and RMCB
problem is not adaptive submodular.
Lemma 3 ( [1]). If the RMSB and RMCB problem conform one
of following two special cases:
1) k ≤ 1
2) For all {u, v} ∈ E, puv = 1
The objective function f is adaptive submodular.
Those properties suitable to RMSB problem can be ap-
plied to RMCB problem, because their objective function is
identical, but constraints are different. Therefore, for RMSB
problem, we have
Theorem 2. The adaptive greedy policy pis, given by Algorithm
1, for RMSB problem is a (1 − 1/e)-approximate solution when
k ≤ 1 or pe = 1 for each e ∈ E. Hence, we have
favg(pi
s) ≥ (1− 1/e) · favg(pi∗) (9)
where pi∗ is optimal policy s.t. |H(pi∗, φ)| ≤ b for all φ.
Proof. From Lemma 1, the objective function f is adaptive
monotone, and from Lemma 3, f is adaptive submodular
when k ≤ 1 or pe = 1 for each e ∈ E. The adaptive greedy
policy is a (1−1/e)-approximation under the size constraint
according to the conclusion of [23].
In [30], Golovin et al. analyzed the theoretical per-
formance of adaptive submodular optimization under p-
independence system. The main conclusions are summa-
rized as follows:
Lemma 4 ( [30]). Given an adaptive monotone and submodular
function f and a p-independence system (V, I), the adaptive α-
approximate greedy policy pi under the constraint I yields and
α/(p+ α)-approximation. Hence, we have
favg(pi) ≥
(
α
p+ α
)
· favg(pi∗) (10)
where pi∗ is optimal policy s.t. H(pi∗, φ) ∈ I for all φ.
Therefore, for RMCB problem, we have
Theorem 3. The adaptive greedy policy pic, given by Algorithm
2, for RMCB problem is a (1/2)-approximate solution when k ≤
1 or pe = 1 for each e ∈ E. Hence, we have
favg(pi
c) ≥ (1/2) · favg(pi∗) (11)
where pi∗ is optimal policy s.t. |H(pi∗, φ) ∩ Ci| ≤ bi for any
i ∈ {1, 2, ..., r} and all φ.
Proof. From Lemma 1, the objective function f is adaptive
monotone, and from Lemma 3, f is adaptive submodular
when k ≤ 1 or pe = 1 for each e ∈ E. As we said before,
the constraint of community budget can be classified to
partition matroid. The independent set I in Lemma 4 can be
defined by Equation (5). It is 1-independence system, thus,
we have p = 1. And the adaptive greedy policy is exact,
which means that α = 1. According to Lemma 4, Equation
(10), we have α/(p+ α) = 1/2 finally.
5.2 Non-Submodularity
In addition to the special cases we discuss in the last subsec-
tion, the objective function of RMSB problem is not adaptive
submodular, thus, the approximation ratio in Theorem 2
cannot be held in general cases. In order to deal with the
general cases that is not adaptive submodular, we get help
from the concept of adaptive primal curvature, proposed by
[16], to obtain the approximation bound for adaptive greedy
policy without adaptive submodularity. Wang et al. [31]
were the first to propose the concept of elemental curvature,
which is the maximum ratio of the marginal gain of an
element i at any subset S and S ∪ {j} for any element j.
Extended to adaptive case, adaptive primal curvature [16]
was formulated, which is the ratio of the marginal gain of
element i under partial realization ψ and ψ ∪ {s}, where s
is possible state for any element j. Thus, we have
Definition 5 (Adaptive Primal Curvature [16]). Given a
adaptive momotone function f , the adaptive primal curvature is
∇f (i, j|ψ) = E
[
∆(i|ψ ∪ s)
∆(i|ψ)
∣∣∣∣s ∈ S(j)] (12)
where S(j) is the state set of j and ∆ is conditional expected
marginal benefit, defined as Definition 2.
From Equation (12), the ∇f (i, j|ψ) measures the chang-
ing of the conditional expected marginal benefit because of
j added to the solution previously. Under the background
of RMSB and RMCB problem, the meaning of ∆(i|ψ ∪ s)
is a little different. Here, i and j represent the users that
are invited to be initiators. Let us look at the term: ψ ∪ s,
s(j) can be 0 or 1. When s(j) = 0, ψ ∪ s means we only
add state s(j) = 0 to ψ. But when s(j) = 1, the meaning
of ψ ∪ s will be more complicated, where we not only add
the state s(j) = 1 to ψ, but also all state change of edges
since j becomes an initiator should be added to ψ. Thus,
the expectation of primal curvature is with respect to the
acceptance probability of i and j, and edge probabilities. In
the non-adaptive case, s(j) = 1 is determined, the elemental
curvature is the maximum primal curvature. To measure the
total change form partial realization ψ to ψ′, total primal
curvature [16] is defined as follows:
Definition 6 (Adaptive Total Primal Curvature [16]). Let
ψ ⊂ ψ′ and let ψ → ψ′ represents the set of possible state
sequences changing from partial realization ψ to ψ′. Then the
adaptive total primal curvature is
Γ(i|ψ′, ψ) = E
 ∏
sj∈Q
∇′ (i, sj |ψ ∪ [sj−1])
∣∣∣∣∣Q ∈ ψ → ψ′

where [sj−1] = {s1, ..., sj−1} and
∇′(i, sj |ψ) = ∆(i|ψ ∪ sj)
∆(i|ψ)
which is a simplified notation of the adaptive primal curvature
corresponded to a single state sj ∈ S(j).
In the following, we can find a constant upper bound of
the adaptive total primal curvature for the RMSB problem
and a relationship between any policy with budget b and
adaptive greedy policy with any budget. Then, according to
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that, the approximation ratio of general RMSB problem can
be found later.
Lemma 5. The adaptive total primal curvature Γ(i|ψ′, ψ) for
any i, ψ and ψ′ is upper bounded by δ, Γ(i|ψ′, ψ) ≤ δ in the
general cases for RMSB problem, where
δ =
R0 + (n− 1) ·R1
R0 −R1 (13)
Proof. The adaptive total primal curvature Γ(i|ψ′, ψ) can be
denoted by Γ(i|ψ′, ψ) = ∆(i|ψ′)/∆(i|ψ). Let us assume
sequence {s1, s2, ..., sl} ∈ φ→ φ′, we have
∆(i|ψ ∪ {s1})
∆(i|ψ) ·
∆(i|ψ ∪ {s1, s2})
∆(i|ψ ∪ {s1}) · · ·
∆(i|ψ′)
∆(i|ψ ∪ [sl−1])
From above, the product for any sequence from partial re-
alization ψ to ψ′ can be reduced to ∆(i|ψ′)/∆(i|ψ) trivially.
Then, we have
Γ(i|ψ′, ψ) ≤ θi ·maxψ ∆(i|ψ, s(i) = 1)
θi ·minψ ∆(i|ψ, s(i) = 1) (14)
where ∆(i|ψ, s(i) = 1) is the marginal gain assuming that
user i accepts to be the initiator. For maxψ ∆(i|ψ, s(i) = 1),
the revenue from user i is at most R0 and from each of user
in V \{i} is at most R1. Considering an extreme example,
there exists an edge from user i to each of user j ∈ V \{i}
and the edge probability is equal to 1 for each edge. Thus,
the total revenue because of selecting i as initiator could be
at most R0 +(n−1) ·R1. For minψ ∆(i|ψ, s(i) = 1), we need
to know the current participation role of user i, maybe user
i is a x-hop participant, x ∈ {1, 2, ..., k} before selecting i as
initiator. The revenue from user i is equal to R0−Rx. Based
on Benefit diminishing assumption, R1 ≥ R2 ≥ ... ≥ Rk,
the revenue from user i is at least R0 − R1. Considering
an extreme example, all neighbors of user i have been 1-hop
participants before selecting i as initiator, there is no revenue
for other users. Thus, the total revenue because of selecting
i as initiator could be at most R0 − R1. Combined with the
above analysis, the Lemma is held.
Let us denote by pib any policy that inviting exact b users,
and pigl by the adaptive greedy policy that inviting l users.
Besides, we define gl as the lth user who is invited to be an
initiator in adaptive greedy policy. Then, we can bound the
adaptive greedy policy that inviting l users with any policy
that inviting exact b users.
Lemma 6. The difference of expected revenue bewtween any
policy pib and adaptive greedy policy pi
g
l in the general cases for
RMSB problem can be bounded by
favg(pib)− favg(pigl ) ≤ bδ ·∆l+1 (15)
where we assume l < b and ∆l+1 is defined as ∆l+1 =
favg(pi
g
l+1)− favg(pigl ).
Proof. We know favg(pib) ≤ favg(pigl @pib) because favg(·) is
adaptive monotone [23]. From it, we have
favg(pib)− favg(pigl ) ≤ favg(pigl @pib)− favg(pigl )
The difference of expected revenue between pib and pi
g
l can
be bounded by running pib after running pi
g
l . It means that
we need to send b invitations again. Supposing that ψ is the
partial realization generated by pigl , the initiators selected
by pib is on partial realization ψ′ such that ψ ⊂ ψ′. Then,
we have ∆(i|ψ′) ≤ δ∆(gl+1|ψ) if ψ ⊂ ψ′ and i /∈ dx(ψ),
because ∆(i|ψ′) = Γ(i|ψ′, ψ) · ∆(i|ψ) ≤ δ∆(gl|ψ) from
Lemma 5. Therefore,
favg(pib)− favg(pigl )
≤ bδ · E[∆(gl+1|ψ)|ψ]
= bδ · E[E[f(dx(ψ) ∪ {gl+1},Φ)− f(dx(ψ),Ψ)|Φ ∼ ψ]|ψ]
= bδ · E[f(H(pigl+1,Φ),Φ)− f(H(pigl ,Φ),Φ)]
= bδ · favg(pigl+1)− favg(pigl )
= bδ ·∆l+1
where the first inequality is from seeding b invitations again,
and other equality from Definition 2 and Equation (4).
So far, we can obtain the main theorem in this paper
that gets the approximation of RMSB problem in the general
cases that is not adaptive submodular.
Theorem 4. The approximation performance of Adaptive greedy
policy pigb , given by Algorithm 1, in the general cases for RMSB
problem satisfies the following:
favg(pi
g
b ) ≥
(
1− e− 1δ
)
· favg(pib) (16)
when we hypothesize ∆b+1 ≤ (1− 1/bδ)b ·∆1.
Proof. According to the Lemma 6, favg(pib) − favg(pigl ) can
be bounded by bδ ·∆l+1, we have
favg(pib) ≤ favg(pigl ) + bδ ·∆l+1 (17)
=
l∑
i=1
∆l + bδ ·∆l+1 (18)
where favg(pi
g
l ) =
∑l
i=1 ∆l and ∆l = favg(pi
g
l )−favg(pigl−1).
We note that favg(pi
g
0) = 0. Multiply both side by (1 −
(bδ)−1)b−l of Inequality (17) and sum from l = 1 to b. The
left hand side of Inequality (17) can be reduced to
b∑
l=1
(
1− 1
bδ
)b−l
·favg(pib) = bδ
[
1−
(
1− 1
bδ
)b]
·favg(pib)
Similarly, the right hand side of Inequality (17) can be
written as follows:
b∑
l=1
[favg(pi
g
l ) + bδ ·∆l+1]
(
1− 1
bδ
)b−l
(19)
Then, (19) can be reduced to
=
b∑
l=1
[
l∑
i=1
∆l + bδ ·∆l+1
](
1− 1
bδ
)b−l
=
b∑
l=1
(
1− 1
bδ
)b−l
·
l∑
i=1
∆l + bδ
b∑
l=1
(
1− 1
bδ
)b−l
·∆l+1
=
b∑
l=1
(
1− 1
bδ
)b−l
·
l∑
i=1
∆l + bδ
b+1∑
l=2
(
1− 1
bδ
)b−l+1
·∆l
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Rearrange and separate the term ∆l, then combine its coef-
ficients, we have
=
b∑
l=1
 b∑
j=l
(
1− 1
bδ
)b−j
+ bδ
(
1− 1
bδ
)b−l+1 ·∆l
+ bδ
[(
1− 1
bδ
)b−(b+1)+1
·∆b+1 −
(
1− 1
bδ
)b−1+1
·∆1
]
Here, if we assume
∆b+1 ≤
(
1− 1
bδ
)b
·∆1 (20)
Then, we have
≤
b∑
l=1
 b∑
j=l
(
1− 1
bδ
)b−j
+ bδ
(
1− 1
bδ
)b−l+1 ·∆l
=
b∑
l=1
bδ
[(
1−
(
1− 1
bδ
))b−l+1
+
(
1− 1
bδ
)b−l+1]
·∆l
=
b∑
l=1
bδ ·∆l = bδ · favg(pigb )
Therefore, combining with above, we have
favg(pi
g
b ) ≥
[
1−
(
1− 1
bδ
)b]
· favg(pib) (21)
Then, we can obtain the conclusion, Inequality (16), when
b→∞ from Inequality (21).
5.3 Further Estimation
From the Lemma 5 in the last subsection, it gives us an
upper bound δ of Γ(i|ψ′, ψ) for any i, ψ and ψ′. However,
this estimation is too rough to get a valid approximation
ratio. A natural question is whether we can obtain a tight
upper bound. For maxψ ∆(i|ψ, s(i) = 1), there exists a more
precise solution which depends on the structure of network
dataset. Given a user i ∈ V , all the potential following
participants can be found by breath-first searching, here
we assume the edge probability in network is equal to 1.
Then, we can determine the hop of these followers from
this initiator i. The maximum revenue from user i and her
following participants can be known. Finally, we choose
the largest one among all users as the upper bound of
maxψ ∆(i|ψ, s(i) = 1). Given targeted network G = (V,E)
and revenue vector R, the calculation steps are as follows:
1) For each user i ∈ V , we find all potential fol-
lowers by breath-first searching, defined as Ni =
{S0, S1, ..., Sk}, where S0 = {i} and Sj , j ∈
{1, 2, ..., k}, is the set of potential j-hop participants
to user i. It means that the length of the shortest
path from a user in Sj to user i is equal to j.
2) For each user i ∈ V , we compute the maximum
possible revenue from i and her followers, which
can be expressed as Pi, where
Pi =
k∑
j=0
Ri · |Si| (22)
3) Finally, we select the largest Pmax = maxi∈V {Pi}
as the upper bound of maxψ ∆(i|ψ, s(i) = 1).
Thus, from above process, we can get a estimated vec-
tor P = (P1, P2, ..., Pn), which can be computed directly
according to the graph dataset. Then, we have
Lemma 7. The adaptive total primal curvature Γ(i|ψ′, ψ) for
any i, ψ and ψ′ is upper bounded by δ, Γ(i|ψ′, ψ) ≤ δ in the
general cases for RMSB problem, where
δ = max{Pi : Pi ∈ P } · (R0 −R1)−1 (23)
The value of δ is data-dependent. When k is smaller and the
degree distribution is more uniform, the upper bound δ is
more tight. It is in line with our intuition.
6 EXPERIMENT
In this section, we conduct several experiments to validate
the correctness and efficiency of our proposed algorithms
on real datasets. It evaluates Algorithm 1 and 2 with some
common used baseline algorithms.
6.1 Dataset Description and Statistics
Our experiments are relied on the datasets from net-
workrepository.com [32], an online network repository.
There are three datasets used in our experiments: (1)
Dataset-1: A co-authorship network, where each edge is a
co-authorship among scientists to publish papers in the area
of network theory. (2) Dataset-2: A Wiki network, which is
a who-votes-on-whom network collected from Wikipedia.
(3) A Collaboration network extracted from Arxiv General
Relativity. The statistics information of the three datasets is
represented in table 1.
TABLE 1
The statistics of three datasets
Dataset n m Type Average degree
Dataset-1 0.4K 1.01K undirected 4
Dataset-2 1.0K 3.15K undirected 6
Dataset-3 5.2K 14.5K undirected 5
6.2 Experimental Settings
As mentioned earlier, our proposed algorithms are based
on the following parameters: Hop number k (at most k-
hop participants follow an initiator), Acceptance vector θ,
Revenue vector R, budget b(b) and edge probability. There
are two experiments we perform to test Algorithm 1 and 2
used to solve RMSB and RMCB problem, called submodualr
performance and non-submodular performance. Shown as
Lemma 3, the objective function of RMSB and RMCB is
adaptive submodular when k ≤ 1 or pe = 1 for all e ∈ E.
Thus, for submodular performance, we set (1) edge proba-
bility pe = 0.5 for all e ∈ E and k = 1; (2) edge probability
pe = 1 for all e ∈ E and k = 2. And in Algorithm 1 and
2, we estimate the Conditional Expected Marginal Benefit
∆(u|φ) for each u ∈ V by the simplifed method of Section
4.2 in [1]. For non-submodular performance, we set (1) edge
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(a) Dataset-1
(b) Dataset-2
(c) Dataset-3
Fig. 2. Submodular performance: the performance comparison of algo-
rithms with different budgets on these three datasets. Parameter settings
are pe = 0.5 for each e ∈ E and k = 1. Left column is to solve RMSB
problem, and right column is to solve RMCB.
probability pe = 0.5 for all e ∈ E and k = 2; (2) edge
probability pe = 0.5 for all e ∈ E and k = 3. We conduct
these two experiments on the three datasets shown as above,
and analyze their experimental results.
For submodular performance and non-submodular per-
formance, we observe the outcomes of our Algorithm 1,
Algorithm 2 and some common used heuristic algorithms,
then we compare the results of their performance. It aims
to evaluate the effectiveness of the adaptive greedy policy
on adaptive (non-)submodular cases under the size and
community budget. The Revenue vector R can be set as:
(1) (8, 6) when k = 1; (2) (8, 6, 4) when k = 2; (3) (8, 6, 4, 2)
when k = 3. It means that the revenue of 0-hop participant
is 8 units, 1-hop is 6 units, 2-hop is 4 units and 3-hop is 2
units. The baseline algorithms are shown as follows:
1) MaxDegree: Invite the user with maximum degree
at each step within budget b(b).
2) Random: Invite a user randomly from V at each step
within budget b(b).
3) MaxProb: Invite the user with maximum acceptance
probability at each step within budget b(b).
We use python programming to test each algorithm. The
(a) Dataset-1
(b) Dataset-2
(c) Dataset-3
Fig. 3. Submodular performance: the performance comparison of algo-
rithms with different budgets on these three datasets. Parameter settings
are pe = 1 for each e ∈ E and k = 2. Left column is to solve RMSB
problem, and right column is to solve RMCB.
simulation is run on a Windows machine with a 3.40GHz, 4
core Intel CPU and 16GB RAM.
6.3 Experimental Results
In our experiments, the whole datasets are considered as
the targeted networks. These adaptive algorithms, including
our proposed algorithms and other baseline algorithms, are
run 50 times on each network, and we take the average
of them as the final results. To size budget, it is easy to
understand that the number of invitations is limited as b.
However, for RMCB problem, we need to know how to
define this community budget b. Here, we adopt such a
strategy: Suppose the total number of invitations in budget
b is predefined, the budget for each community can be
represented as follows: GivenG = (V,E) and budget vector
b = (b1, b2, ..., br), we have
br =
⌊ |Cr| · (Total invitations of b)
|V |
⌋
(24)
It is possible that
∑r
i=1 bi is not equal to the total invitations
of b. We need to make some adjustments such that
∑r
i=1 bi
is equal to the total invitation of b: add one or mimus one
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(a) Dataset-1
(b) Dataset-2
(c) Dataset-3
Fig. 4. Non-submodular performance: the performance comparison of
algorithms to solve RMSB problem with different budgets on these three
datasets. Left column: parameter settings are pe = 0.5 for each e ∈ E
and k = 2. Right column: parameter settings are pe = 0.5 for each
e ∈ E and k = 3.
to each community’s budget from large community to small
community until satisfying equality. Let us look at a specific
example:
Example 1. Considering the right columns of Fig. 2 and Fig. 3,
”Budget b = 20” means the total invitations of b is 20. Suppose
that the community structure is C(G) = {C1, C2, C3, C3},
where |C1| = 50, |C2| = 40, |C3| = 30, and |C4| = 20, we have
b1 = b50 × 20/140c = 7, b2 = 5, b3 = 4, and b4 = 2. Now,∑4
i=1 bi = 18 < 20, thus, we let b1 = 7+1 = 8, b2 = 5+1 = 7
and others maintain so that satisfying
∑4
i=1 bi = 20. This is
because C1 and C2 are the largest communities.
For submodular performance, the experimental results
achieved by different algorithms on these three datasets are
shown as Fig. 2 and Fig. 3. The left columns of Fig. 2 and Fig.
3 are under the size budget, and we can see that the expected
total revenues returned by RMSBSolver is larger than other
policies. The right columns of Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 are under the
community budget, and the performance of RMCBSolver is
better than other policies as well. Especially on Dataset-3,
the gap between RMSBSolver and other baseline algorithms
is very significant, which may be related to the size of
the dataset and the network structure. The performance
of baseline algorithm, such as MaxDegree, is on and off,
good for Dataset-2 and bad for Dataset-3. Thus, we cannot
predict whether it is good or bad in advance. An interesting
discovery is that, intuitively, the total revenue of RMCB
should be smaller than that of RMSB, because the constraint
of RMCB is more strict and the approximation performance
of RMSBSolver is better than that of RMCBSolver. But, from
the results, their expected total revenues are very close
regardless of adaptive greedy strategy or other heuristic
policies, even sometimes the revenues obtained under the
community budget are better. For example, on Dataset-3, the
performance of MaxDegree algorithm under the community
budget is apparently better than that under the size budget.
Therefore, considering the distribution of influence and the
average revenue comprehensively, community budget is a
more sensible choice to us.
For non-submodular performance, the experimental re-
sults achieved by different algorithms on these three
datasets are shown as Fig. 4. We can see that the expected
total revenues returned by RMSBSolver is larger than other
policies. Same as before, on Dataset-3, the gap between
RMSBSolver and other baseline algorithms is very signif-
icant. Even though the objective function of RMSB is not
adaptive submodular, from the actual performance, this
effect does not seem obvious. In other words, the objective
function of RMSB is close to adaptive submodular. Accord-
ing to Lemma 7, the bound δ of these three datasets are
shown as follows:
TABLE 2
The bound δ of three datasets
Dataset-1 Dataset-2 Dataset-3
k = 2 106 310 247
k = 3 199 1060 820
Unfortunately, this results is frustrating. Even if the bound
given by Lemma 7 is much smaller than that given by
Lemma 5, it is still too large to get a satisfactory approx-
imation ratio. Thus, we need to look for a more compact
estimation method of bound δ further so as to get a practical
and meaningful approximation ratio.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose RMSB problem based on Collabo-
rate Game model. In order to consider the distribution of in-
fluence and total revenue, we extend RMSB to RMCB prob-
lem by use of community budget. We proposed RMSBSolver
and RMCBSolver to address both of them according to the
adaptive greedy policy. The objective function of RMSB and
RMCB is adaptive monotone and not adaptive submodular,
but adaptive submodular in some special cases. Then, we re-
duce the community budget of RMCB to partition matroid,
which can be solved within (1/2)-approximation under the
special submodular cases. For RMSB problem under the
general non-submodular cases, we give a data-dependent
(1 − e− 1δ )-approximation through bounding the adaptive
total primal curvature by δ. The good performance of our
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algorithms is verified by our experiments on three real
network datasets. The performance under the community
budget is not worse than that under the size budget, thus,
community budget is a better choice. However, the bound δ
is not satisfactory, in future, we need to improve it further
such that getting a smaller one.
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